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Abstract
This article offers a reading of Jean-Paul Sartre’s phenomenology in light of Jean-Luc
Marion’s more recent phenomenology. It may seem odd to compare Sartre to
Marion, given that Sartre is well-known for his avowed atheism and his account of
intentionality while Marion is primarily known for his work on religious phenomena
and counter-intentionality. However, this article shows that there are many ways in
which Sartre anticipates Marion’s work on phenomenological reduction and exces-
sive phenomenality. By reading Sartre’s phenomenology in light of Marion’s, and
particularly Sartre’s analysis of the viscous slime in Being and Nothingness in relation
to Marion’s account of ‘saturated phenomena’, this article presents a fresh interpret-
ation of Sartre as a phenomenologist who has invaluable insights not only on the
structures of consciousness and phenomenality, but also for the contemporary the-
oretical interest in the relationship between human and nonhuman entities.
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Much of recent French phenomenology has taken a strong interest in
religion and theology, often described as having taken what Dominique
Janicaud (2000) calls a ‘theological turn’ or what Christina
Gschwandtner (2018) terms a ‘turn to excess’. Aside from the analysis
of religious phenomena, one common interest shared by practising
Christian phenomenologists associated with this recent ‘turn’, such as
Jean-Luc Marion and Michel Henry, is a strong focus on phenomena
whose phenomenality are in ‘excess’ of the usual expectations of subject-
ive experience, which in turn problematize the traditional Husserlian
definition of consciousness in terms of intentionality. Put differently,
what we find in this ‘turn’ is not just a turn away from the traditional
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phenomenological focus on intentionality as the structure and definition
of human consciousness and subjectivity, but more positively what
Gschwandtner (2018: 456) describes as ‘a more radical return to the
things themselves’ which ‘allow[s] them to give themselves on their own
terms, to flood us with their intuitive givenness rather than being con-
stituted, constructed, defined, and limited by our intentionality’.
This article offers a reading of Jean-Paul Sartre’s early phenomen-
ology, particularly his analysis of the viscous slimy ‘thing’ in Being
and Nothingness, in light of this ‘radical return to the things them-
selves’ in contemporary phenomenology. Sartre’s cryptic account of
the viscous slime has received much interest in contemporary social
and cultural theory, from Sara Ahmed’s (2014: 89–92) feminist affect
theory to Timothy Morton’s (2013: 27–37) object-oriented eco-theory
to Brian McNely’s (2019) theory of ambient rhetoric. However, these
theoretical treatments of Sartre’s viscous slime are often primarily
speculative or metaphorical in manner, and largely underplay the phe-
nomenological analysis of human experience central to Sartre’s ori-
ginal account. By reading Sartre’s analysis of the slime through
Marion’s ‘phenomenality-oriented’ (as opposed to ‘subject-oriented’)
account of phenomenology, this article seeks to highlight the import-
ant phenomenological insights of Sartre’s analysis of the viscous as
well as the ways in which Sartre’s early phenomenology anticipates
and parallels Marion’s later account of the ‘saturated phenomenon’.
Accordingly, this article’s comparative reading of Sartre and Marion
can not only help us re-assess the trajectory of the phenomenological
tradition with regard to its ‘theological turn’ to ‘excess’; it can also
supplement the contemporary discussion of Sartre’s notion of the vis-
cous slime and how the Sartrean analysis of nonhuman phenomena
can potentially contribute to the increasing theoretical interest in the
status or even ‘agency’ of inanimate things in recent social and cul-
tural studies.
After briefly summarizing the basic tenets of Sartre’s phenomenology
(Section I), this article offers a reading of Sartre’s notion of ‘being in-
itself’ – what he also calls ‘the being of phenomena’ in the introduction to
Being and Nothingness – as an account of phenomenality in relation to
Marion’s account of phenomenological reduction and givenness (Section
II). Furthermore, the article argues that the ambiguous figure of the
viscous slime which Sartre analyses in the final chapter of Being and
Nothingness is an instance of what Marion would call a saturated phe-
nomenon insofar as it epitomizes the character of phenomenality as pure
‘givenness’ (Section III). Finally, this article concludes by highlighting
how these elements of Sartre’s atheistic works can not only illuminate
various aspects and presuppositions of Marion’s supposed ‘theological’
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turn to ‘excess’, but also how phenomenological inquiry can relate to
contemporary social and cultural critique.
I Intentionality
In his landmark critique of the ‘theological turn’ in French phenomen-
ology, Janicaud (2000: 18) argues that ‘the most significant text [in the
original reception of Husserlian phenomenology in France] is brief, but
dazzling. It is signed ‘‘Sartre’’ and entitled ‘‘Intentionality: A
Fundamental Idea of Husserl’s Phenomenology’’.’ In these few short
pages written in January 1939, Sartre highlights the centrality of ‘inten-
tionality’ in Husserl’s phenomenology. According to Sartre (1970: 5),
Husserl’s notion of intentionality refers to the ‘necessity for conscious-
ness to exist as consciousness of something other than itself’. For Sartre,
insofar as intentional consciousness is always conscious of something
that is other than itself or indeed outside itself, what Husserl’s account
of the intentional character of consciousness accomplishes is nothing less
than a ‘purification’ of consciousness:
All at once consciousness is purified, it is clear as a strong wind.
There is nothing in it but a movement of fleeing itself, a sliding
beyond itself . . . for consciousness has no ‘inside’. It is just this
being beyond itself, this absolute flight, this refusal to be a substance
which makes it a consciousness. (Sartre, 1970: 5)
However, in Sartre’s reading, Husserl himself fails to realize the full
implications of his own insight. Critiquing Husserl’s rendition of con-
sciousness in terms of a transcendental subject or ‘ego’ in The
Transcendence of the Ego (written around the same time as his essay
on intentionality), Sartre (1972: 38) argues that ‘phenomenology does
not need to appeal to any such unifying and individualizing I’ precisely
because ‘consciousness is defined by intentionality’. For Sartre, the very
fact that consciousness is defined by nothing other than intentionality
means that there cannot be a ‘transcendental I’ or inner self that sits
‘behind each consciousness [as] a necessary structure of consciousness’
(p. 37). Because if consciousness is always conscious of something that is
other than itself, and if consciousness is conscious of an ‘I’ (e.g. when a
conscious being consciously says ‘I think’), this ‘I’ must be something
that is other than consciousness. As such, for Sartre, consciousness is
properly intentional and conscious if and only if it is ‘without an I’ (pp.
36, 41): There is no room for an ‘I’ in consciousness. It is only when
consciousness is ‘purified of all egological structure’ that we can realize
the true intentional character of consciousness (p. 93): ‘This absolute
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consciousness, when it is purified of the I, no longer has anything of the
subject’ (p. 106).
This ‘empty’ conception of intentional consciousness is further devel-
oped in Being and Nothingness:
[A]ll consciousness is consciousness of something. In other words,
there is no [act of] consciousness that does not posit a transcendent
object or, if you prefer, consciousness has no ‘content’ . . . [Thus] it
is a pure ‘appearance’, where this means it exists only to the extent
to which it appears . . . consciousness is pure appearance, because it
is a total void (since the entire world is outside it). (Sartre, 2020: 9–
10, 16, original emphasis)
It is for this reason that Sartre (2020: 140, 229–30, 594, 807) character-
izes consciousness as ‘nothingness’ or ‘for-itself’ (pour-soi) in Being and
Nothingness: consciousness always exists in relation to – or indeed it exists
for (pour) – some being that is beyond and other than consciousness;
consciousness is nothing but a relation to some phenomenon that is ‘in-
itself’ (en-soi). These two ontological categories of ‘in-itself’ and ‘for-itself’
– ‘being’ and ‘consciousness’ – are respectively the two notions that are
named in the title of his magnum opus Being and Nothingness. As the
names of ‘being’ and ‘nothingness’ indicate, these two ontological cate-
gories are strictly mutually exclusive: there cannot be a being that is both
in-itself and for-itself – what Sartre (2020: 480) calls an ‘in-itself-for-itself’.
However, Sartre notes that the ‘in-itself-for-itself’ is nonetheless an
ideal that is fervently desired by consciousness. In fact, this ideal which
consciousness desires is what Sartre calls ‘God’, as Sartre (2020: 735)
writes in a well-known passage in Being and Nothingness:
[T]he in-itself-for-itself [is] the ideal of a consciousness that could be
the foundation of its own being-in-itself purely by means of its own
being conscious of itself. To this ideal, we can give the name ‘God’.
So we can say the best way to conceive of human-reality’s funda-
mental project is to regard man as the being whose project is to
be God.
The ‘in-itself-for-itself’ is seen as the ideal of the for-itself because it is
within the intentional character of consciousness for-itself to wish to
grasp and comprehend the in-itself which it is not.
For Sartre, the for-itself’s desire to fully grasp and comprehend being
in-itself is inherently futile. Such a desire to become ‘God’ or ‘in-itself-
for-itself’ is, in Sartre’s (2020: 797) famous words, ‘a useless passion’ for
‘man loses himself as man’ in order to become God. Because for Sartre, it
is ontologically impossible for there to be a complete unity or coincidence
of the for-itself and in-itself: For if the for-itself could fully grasp the
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in-itself, it would by definition no longer be for-itself – as there will no
longer be a transcendent being in-itself for it be conscious of. Without
anything to be conscious of, the for-itself can no longer exist as con-
sciousness – it is no longer intentional: ‘it destroys itself’ (Sartre, 1970:
5, original emphasis). The structure of conscious intentionality lies at the
very heart of Sartre’s ontology as well as his philosophical affirmation of
the impossibility of God’s existence (see Leung, 2020).
As alluded to above, this centrality of intentional consciousness is no
longer found in the later phenomenological tradition after the ‘theo-
logical turn’, such as works by Marion as well as other religious phe-
nomenologists like Michel Henry (see Calcagno, 2008). In fact, in
contradistinction to his predecessors’ focus on intentionality in the phe-
nomenological tradition,1 what we find in Marion’s phenomenological
account of the saturated phenomenon is an emphasis on non-intentional
intuition or even what Marion enigmatically calls ‘counter-intentional-
ity’. But before further examining Marion’s much discussed notion of
saturated phenomena and its ‘counter-intentional’ features, a few words
ought to be said about Marion’s broader understanding of the task of
phenomenology.
II Phenomenality
Instead of intentionality, Marion (1998) sees the method of ‘reduction’ as
the core feature of phenomenology and that the phenomenological trad-
ition is marked by a series of breakthroughs in the development of this
method. For Marion, the towering figures of Husserl and Heidegger
respectively represent (the first) two stages of this development.
Whereas Husserl’s ‘first reduction’ allows the transcendental subject to
apprehend objects as correlates of noetic acts of consciousness,
Heidegger’s ‘second reduction’ shifts the phenomenological focus from
beings to the Being of beings – from the phenomena of beings to the
phenomenon of ‘Being itself’ (Marion, 1998: 204). Despite the break-
throughs of their ‘first’ and ‘second’ reductions, Marion (2008: 14)
argues that both Husserl and Heidegger ultimately took for granted
‘the principle of horizon’ prevalently presumed in the phenomenological
tradition. According to Marion (2002a: 39–61), by respectively imposing
the a priori (i.e. extra-phenomenological) conceptual limits of ‘object’
and ‘Being’ onto phenomena, Husserl and Heidegger remained captive
respectively to the ‘horizons’ of what he calls ‘objectness’ (objectité) and
‘beingness’ (étantité). As opposed to objectness and beingness, Marion
(2008: 80–1) argues instead that all phenomena and indeed the structure
of phenomenality itself are fundamentally characterized by givenness
(donation) – the very fact that a phenomenon is given to consciousness.
Bringing together Husserl’s notion of ‘givenness’ (Gegebenheit) and
Heidegger’s definition of phenomenon as ‘that which shows itself in
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itself’ (das Sich-an-ihm-selbst-zeigende), Marion (2002a: 68–70) argues
that a phenomenon ought to be simply defined as that which shows
itself inasmuch as it gives itself. For Marion, it is only when phenomen-
ology moves from the analyses of various phenomena to inquire into the
very structure of phenomenality as such that the phenomenological trad-
ition can arrive at what he calls the ‘third reduction’ of reducing phe-
nomena to the phenomenality of pure givenness. While Marion seeks to
undertake the task of the ‘third reduction’ with his account of the satu-
rated phenomenon (further examined below), a similar ‘reduction’
beyond Husserl’s and Heidegger’s can be found in Sartre’s dense intro-
duction to Being and Nothingness, which opens with the very proposition
that modern thought has made considerable progress by ‘reducing [rédui-
sant] the existent to the series of appearances that manifest it’ (Sartre,
2020: 1, emphasis added).
In the opening sections of his introduction to Being and Nothingness,
Sartre (2020: 1–7) seeks to delineate ‘the phenomenon of being’ from ‘the
being of phenomena’. Not dissimilar to Marion’s stages of phenomeno-
logical reduction, Sartre notes that while the great contribution Husserl’s
‘return to things themselves’ made to philosophy was the abolishment of
the dualism between being and appearance (p. 2), Heidegger moves
beyond Husserl by reducing the phenomena of individual beings or
objects such as tables and chairs to the phenomenon of ‘Being’ itself
(pp. 6–7).2 However, for Sartre, Heidegger’s phenomenological reduction
ultimately remains at the level of ‘the phenomenon of being’ instead of
‘the being of phenomena’. In other words, Heidegger fails to ask the
more ‘reduced’ question of what is a phenomenon or indeed the condi-
tion and foundation of phenomenality per se. Sartre writes:
Of course, I can surpass this table or this chair toward its being, and
I can pose the question of the table-being or chair-being. But in that
moment I look away from the table-phenomenon in order to fasten
on the being-phenomenon, which is no longer the condition of all
disclosure but which is itself something disclosed, and appearance
which, as such, needs in its turn some being on whose foundation it
could be disclosed. (p. 7)
According to Sartre, ‘the phenomenon of being’ is not ‘the being of
phenomena’, but rather something which ‘requires, insofar as it is a phe-
nomenon, a transphenomenal foundation’ (p. 7).
For Sartre, ‘the being of phenomena’ is precisely this transphenomenal
foundation which discloses phenomena to consciousness. In this regard,
it may be said that this ‘condition of all disclosure’ which Sartre calls ‘the
being of phenomena’ is a structure akin to what Marion (2005: 131) calls
‘the phenomenality of all phenomena’ – which Marion sees as the ultim-
ate goal of phenomenological reduction.3 Just as the transphenomenal
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foundation of all phenomena is not reducible to any particular phenom-
enon, Sartre (2020: 7) notes that ‘the being of the phenomenon cannot be
reduced [réduire] to the phenomenon of being’. The transphenomenal
condition of all phenomena is not itself a phenomenon. The being of
phenomena is for Sartre ‘the condition of all disclosure: it is being-in-
order-to-disclose, not being-disclosed [as a phenomenon itself]’ (p. 7).
Thus, instead of reducing ‘the being of phenomena’ to ‘the phenomenon
of being’, what Sartre seeks to undertake in Being and Nothingness is a
phenomenological reduction of ‘the phenomenon of being’ to ‘the being
of phenomena’ – reducing phenomena to the very structure of phenom-
enality as such.
One reason why Sartre insists that the being of the phenomenon
cannot be reduced to the phenomenon of being is because ‘knowledge’
(connaissance) cannot account for the being of phenomena. As Sebastian
Gardner (2009: 43) points out: ‘knowledge, as Sartre understands it,
involves ‘‘determining a thing in concepts’’, and anything that we deter-
mine in concepts can only be a phenomenon.’ Sartre’s ‘reduction’ of
phenomena to the being of phenomena – of phenomena to ‘transpheno-
menal’ phenomenality – is thus a suspension and bracketing of the hori-
zon of conceptual knowledge not unlike Marion’s ‘third reduction’.4
However, for Sartre, just because ‘knowledge’ cannot account for the
phenomenality of phenomena does not mean that we can have no
access to the ‘transphenomenal’ being of phenomena at all:
although the being of the phenomenon is coextensive with the phe-
nomenon it must escape the phenomenal condition in which exist-
ence is possible only to the extent that it is revealed, and
consequently that it overflows and founds any knowledge we can
have of it. (Sartre, 2020: 7)
As something that is transphenomenal, for Sartre (2020: 25–7) the being
of phenomena cannot be limited by any principles we derive from our
phenomenological experience (such as causality). As such, Sartre states
that the being of phenomena – that which he also calls being in-itself
(en soi) – is ‘without any reason for being or any relationship with any
other being’ (p. 29, emphasis added). Sartre’s (2020: 25) emphasis on the
inexplicability of ‘the being-in-itself of phenomena’ is thus not dissimilar
to Marion’s insistence that phenomenology is strictly incompatible with
the principle of sufficient reason of traditional metaphysics.
According to Marion, one of the main contributions of Husserl’s phe-
nomenology is to define phenomena simply by the fact that they are
given:
[Husserl] recognizes the given as such by the simple fact that it is
given . . . the fact of being given to consciousness (in whatever
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manner) testifies to the right of phenomena to be received as such,
that is to say, as they give themselves. To return to the things them-
selves amounts to recognizing phenomena as themselves, without
submitting them to the (sufficient) condition of an anterior author-
ity (such as thing in itself, cause, principle, etc.). In short, it means
liberating them from any prerequisite other than their simple given-
ness. (Marion, 2008: 4–5, emphasis added)
With this liberation from all preconditions aside from givenness,
Marion argues that Husserl’s phenomenological focus on the fact – as
opposed to the reason – of the givenness of phenomena entails nothing
less than ‘a suspension of the principle of sufficient reason insofar as the
phenomenon is not indebted to any reason, because its givenness itself
justifies it’. For Marion (2008: 5), ‘any phenomenon is without why, since
any phenomenon is as it gives itself’.
In Marion’s view, this suspension of the principle of sufficient reason is
best expressed in the phenomenon of the gift. Arguing that the gift only
‘takes on its full meaning in the very absence of motive and sufficient
reason’ (Marion, 2005: 114), Marion notes:
A phenomenon shows itself all the more as itself, in that it gives
itself on the basis of itself . . . The gift shows itself on the basis of
itself because, like every other phenomenon, it gives itself on the
basis of itself, but also because, more radically than every other
phenomenon, it gives its self on the basis of itself. The gift that
gives (itself) gives only on the basis of itself . . . this phenomenon
manifests itself and gives itself as it gives – of itself, on the basis
of itself alone, without any other reason than itself. (Marion,
2005: 126, original emphasis)
Marion’s account of the gift (which is partly a critical response to
Derrida) is complicated and nuanced (see Marion, 2002a: 71–118), but
to the extent that Marion (2005: 128) holds that the gift ‘has no recourse
to any cause, nor to any reason, other than the pure demand of givenness
that it show itself as it gives itself’, we can see why he suggests the gift
may be regarded as ‘the figure of all phenomenality’ (Marion, 2005: 131;
2010: 112).
As opposed to the principle of sufficient reason, Marion (2002a: 184)
argues that phenomenology subscribes to ‘a principle of sufficient intu-
ition’: ‘To justify its right to appear, intuition is enough for the phenom-
enon, without any other reason; it is enough for it to be given in and
through intuition – according to a principle of sufficient intuition’. For
Marion, this principle is exemplified in what he calls ‘saturated phenom-
ena’ – phenomena that are ‘saturated with intuition’ (p. 4). While Marion
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holds that the structure of phenomenality as ‘givenness’ or self-giving (se
donner) is shared by all phenomena, he also states that it finds its para-
digmatic expression in saturated phenomena (p. 227). To quote Marion
at some length:
To be sure, not all phenomena get classified as saturated phenomena,
but all saturated phenomena accomplish the one and only paradigm
of phenomenality . . . Because it gives itself without condition or
restraint, the saturated phenomenon would offer the paradigm of
the phenomenon finally without reserve . . . by giving itself absolutely,
the saturated phenomenon also gives itself as absolute – free from
any analogy with already seen, objectified, comprehended experience.
It is freed because it does not depend on any horizon. In every case, it
does not depend on this condition of possibility par excellence – a
horizon, whatever it might be. (Marion, 2002a: 227, 218, 211–12)
According to Marion, the saturated phenomenon ‘lets givenness come
before all limitation and every horizon’, and as such, phenomenality is
expressed in the saturated phenomenon ‘first in terms of givenness, such
that the phenomenon no longer gives itself in the measure to which it
shows itself, but shows itself in the measure (or, eventually, lack of meas-
ure) to which it gives itself’ (p. 226).
As mentioned above, saturated phenomena are for Marion (2002a: 4)
phenomena that are saturated with intuition, marked by ‘the excess of
intuition over intention’:
intuition is not bound to and by the intention, but is freed from it
. . . intuition subverts, therefore precedes, every intention, which it
exceeds and decenters . . . here the I of intentionality can neither
constitute nor synthesize the intuition into an object defined by a
horizon. (Marion, 2002: 225–6)
The saturated phenomenon is not only free of being limited by any
prior horizons or conceptual frameworks (be it Husserlian objectness or
Heideggerian beingness) but, moreover, Marion (2008: 13–14) argues
that it calls into question the centrality of the human I which the phe-
nomenological tradition has upheld ‘as the origin of intentionality’ which
‘constitutes objects according to its axis of intentionality’. In fact, accord-
ing to Marion (2002a: 216), the saturated phenomenon ‘not only sus-
pends the phenomenon’s subjection to the I; it inverts it. For, far from
being able to constitute this phenomenon, the I experiences itself as
constituted by it’.
In Marion’s (2002a: 175, 266–7, 283) words, what one experiences in
an encounter with a saturated phenomenon is what he calls a ‘counter-
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intentionality’, for every saturated phenomenon always ‘inverts inten-
tionality’ (p. 267) – an idea which Marion explicitly acknowledges is
indebted to Emmanuel Levinas’ account of ‘the Other’ (pp. 266–7,
269).5 The saturated phenomenon reverses one’s normal expectation to
be able to direct or ‘intend’ one’s intentionality at the phenomenon and
render it an object; instead of ‘apprehending’ the phenomenon, one is
now captivated or indeed apprehended by the phenomenon.6 For
Marion, the experience – or, more properly, what he calls ‘counter-
experience’ – of saturated phenomena unsettles and calls into question
the conditions of experience that are normally assumed under the para-
digm of transcendental subjectivity:
The hypothesis of saturated phenomena never consisted in annulling
or overcoming the conditions for the possibility of experience, but
rather sought to examine whether certain phenomena contradict or
exceed those conditions yet nevertheless still appear, precisely by
exceeding or contradicting them . . . Thus, far from it does nothing
but counteract experience understood in the transcendental sense as
the subsuming of intuition under the concept. (Marion, 2008: 133, 136)
In other words, the ‘counter-experiential’ encounter with saturated
phenomena shows us that there are aspects of experience that cannot
be objectified or contained within the narrow confines of intentionality.
Not unlike Sartre’s (2020: 7) aforementioned proposition that the being
of phenomena ‘overflows’ any knowledge we can have of it, Marion’s
formulation of the saturated phenomenon is marked by its phenomenal
excess over the intentional or conceptual capacities of consciousness,
thereby rendering one’s conscious experience a ‘counter-experience’.
III Viscosity
While he only gives three examples from the history of philosophy which
prefigure his account of saturated phenomena (namely Descartes’ notion
of infinity, Kant’s sublime, and Husserl’s internal consciousness of time),
Marion (2002a: 219–20) suggests that the history of philosophy ‘has long
known such saturated phenomena’ and that ‘no decisive thinker has
omitted the description of one (or several) saturated phenomena, even
at the price of contradicting his own metaphysical presuppositions’.
Following this suggestion, perhaps something like a description of satu-
rated phenomena could be found in the works of Sartre, undoubtedly
one of Marion’s most significant predecessors in French phenomen-
ology.7 While there are certain resemblances between Marion’s expressed
post-Heideggerian phenomenological analysis of the ‘invisible’ and the
‘unapparent’ with Sartre’s phenomenological account of absence and
negation in Being and Nothingness,8 arguably the closest structure to
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Marion’s saturated phenomenon in Sartre’s phenomenological work is
his analysis of a physical substance that is literally saturated with liquid:
the figure of the viscous slime (le visqueux) which appears in the very last
section in the final chapter of Being and Nothingness.
While Sartre’s (2020: 798) explicitly gendered account of the viscous
slime as ‘a sickly sweet and feminine revenge’ in Being and Nothingness is
often interpreted as a sexist symbol of the feminine,9 a number of Sartre’s
early English-speaking commentators have identified Sartre’s figure of
the viscous as (primarily) an ontological notion. For instance, Mary
Warnock argues that Sartre sees the viscous as ‘a symbol of the nature
of the world in general’ (Warnock, 1965: 100) or even ‘a source of reve-
lation of the nature of existence itself’ (Warnock, 1969: xiii), while Iris
Murdoch (1953: 21) writes that the viscous is for Sartre ‘one of the fun-
damental keys or images in terms of which we understand our whole
mode of being, and its sexual character is merely one of its possible
determinations . . . it serves as an image of our consciousness, of the
very form of our appropriation of the world’. Although it is important
to point out the problematic gendered and sexist overtones of Sartre’s
account of the viscous slime, it is in the phenomenological and onto-
logical aspects of Sartre’s analysis (as highlighted by Warnock and
Murdoch) where we find Sartre’s most striking parallels with Marion’s
account of saturated phenomena.
It is in the very same chapter where Sartre provides his most in-depth
account of God as the ‘in-itself-for-itself’ in Being and Nothingness that
Sartre (2020: 778, 783–92, 795) notably dedicates over ten pages to ana-
lysing the phenomenon of the viscous slime.10 At the outset of his ana-
lysis, Sartre emphasizes that the human experience of the viscous slime as
a repugnant yet attractive material substance is not a product or a pro-
jection of the specific perceiver’s culture or upbringing but conditioned
and caused by the very ‘quality’ of viscosity itself (pp. 783–4). In other
words, the phenomenon of viscosity – the way in which the slime reveals
or manifests itself – is not conditioned by the human subject but con-
stituted by the nonhuman phenomenon of the slime itself. In fact, Sartre
goes so far as to say that the viscous ‘disclos[es] itself to us as the onto-
logical expression of the world in its entirety’ (p. 786) – that the slime
discloses to us the structure of all phenomena – or perhaps, even the very
structure of phenomenality per se. As Sartre further notes in his analysis,
‘our apprehension of the viscous as such has created for the world’s in-
itself a particular way of giving itself [créé une manière particulière de se
donner pour l’en-soi du monde]’ (p. 786, translation modified, emphasis
added).
For Sartre (2020: 787), the phenomenon of slime is particularly inter-
esting for its ‘character of a ‘‘substance between two states’’’. While
‘water is the symbol of consciousness’ or the for-itself for Sartre
(p. 790), the in-itself is ‘represented by the pure solid’ (p. 787). With its
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semi-liquid semi-solid texture, the viscous slime represents a ‘possible
fusion’ of the for-itself with in-itself (pp. 786–7) – not unlike the afore-
mentioned ideal being of the ‘In-itself-For-itself’ which Sartre associates
with ‘God’. Indeed, as Sartre notes, the viscous is nothing less than ‘a
being that is the opposite of the ‘‘In-itself-For-itself’’’ (p. 789). As
Karsten Harries (2004: 31) summarizes this point:
Every human being, according to Sartre, seeks to lose himself as
man in order to become God . . . the ideal we vainly pursue. And
just the recognition of such vanity, the recognition that to become
God we would have to lose ourselves as man, strengthens the call of
a counter-ideal that tempts us by beckoning us to give up vain
dreams . . . The counter-ideal, too, tempts us to lose ourselves as
man, but not now to become God, but to allow ourselves to sink
back into that chaotic life from which we emerged.
The viscous slime is precisely this ‘counter-ideal’; it is a ‘counter-God’
– ‘a being that is the opposite of the ‘‘In-itself-For-itself’’’ (Sartre, 2020:
789), or even, as Harries (2004: 30) bluntly puts it, ‘a symbol of Sartre’s
devil’.
While for Sartre the human desire to attain the ideal state of In-itself-
For-itself is a dynamic which underlies all acts of human consciousness –
in which the for-itself is intentionally conscious of some being in-itself,
the usual dynamics of intentionality is unsettled and reversed in one’s
experience – or perhaps even ‘counter-experience’ – of the ‘counter-ideal’
of viscosity.
At first, [the viscous] gives the impression of a being that can be
possessed . . . Only, just at the movement when I believe I possess it,
by means of a curious reversal [un curieux renversement] I am pos-
sessed by it. This is where its essential characteristic makes its
appearance. (Sartre, 2020: 788, original emphasis)
Whereas the for-itself is normally that which intentionally apprehends
– or ‘possesses’ – the in-itself, in the case of a ‘counter-experience’ with
viscosity, Sartre argues that ‘the viscous reverses the terms: suddenly the
for-itself is compromised’ (p. 788, original emphasis). To rephrase this in
transcendental terminology, whereas the intentional object is normally
constituted by the intentional act of consciousness for-itself in common
phenomenological experiences, the dynamics are reversed in the ‘curious’
experience of viscosity: the consciousness for-itself is no longer that
which constitutes the phenomenon of viscosity; rather, consciousness
becomes constituted by the viscous phenomenon – or as Sartre puts it:
‘it is the for-itself’s absorption by the in-itself, like ink by blotting paper’
(p. 790).11
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As such, what we find in the ‘curious reversal’ which occurs in one’s
encounter with the viscous phenomenon is an inversion of intentionality,
where the usual dynamics between the apprehending intentional for-itself
and the apprehended in-itself are reversed. The in-itself is now that which
‘apprehends’ consciousness – as Sartre (2020: 789) puts it: ‘The viscous is
the in-itself’s revenge.’ Sartre’s viscous phenomenon not only upsets and
reverses the common dynamics of intentionality, like Marion’s saturated
phenomena, it moreover cannot be confined to the usual categorical
frameworks or horizons of experience:
[T]he viscous, from my first intuitive contact with it, appears to me
to be replete with obscure meanings and references beyond itself.
The viscous discloses itself as being ‘much more than the viscous’;
from the moment it appears it transcends every distinction between
the psychological and the physical, between the brute existent and
the meanings of the world. (Sartre, 2020: 792, translation modified)
Furthermore, remarking on a child’s first experience of encountering
viscosity, Sartre continues:
What we say in relation to the viscous holds for all the objects which
surround the child: the simple revelation of their matter extends his
horizon to the extreme limits of being [la simple révélation de leur
matière étend son horizon jusqu’aux extrêmes limites de l’être]. (p.
792, translation modified)
While Marion might take issue with Sartre’s terminology of ‘objects’
and ‘being’, as we see in the passage quoted here from Being and
Nothingness, Sartre argues that the (counter-)experience of the viscous
slime stretches our phenomenological ‘horizon’ to its very limits or even
the very limits of our comprehension of ‘being’.12 Indeed, not unlike the
way in which Marion’s saturated phenomenon exceeds all pre-deter-
mined horizons of experience and cognition, Sartre emphasizes that the
viscous ‘discloses itself as being ‘‘much more than the viscous’’’ (p. 792),
as though the viscous is a phenomenon that is more than an object or
even a being – something that is phenomenologically much ‘more than
itself’ (cf. Marion, 2002b: 37).13
The viscous phenomenon which reveals itself as ‘much more than the
viscous’ is not simply as an instance of phenomenological excess where
the phenomenon of viscosity overwhelmingly exceeds any pre-conceived
idea of ‘the viscous’ per se – that the experience of the phenomenon of the
viscous is ‘much more than’ the concept of the viscous. Like Marion’s
saturated phenomenon, Sartre’s viscous phenomenon is more notably
something that exemplifies the character of phenomenality as pure given-
ness. As Warnock and Murdoch argue in their commentaries, Sartre’s
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viscous may be understood as being ‘much more than the viscous’ in the
sense that it represents ‘an objective structure of the world’ (Sartre, 2020:
792) – something obviously ‘much more than’ the viscous phenomenon
itself. Indeed, there are a number of remarks in Being and Nothingness
which confirm such a reading of Sartre’s account of the viscous: ‘the
viscous appears already as a first draft of the world’s fusion with me’
(p. 785); ‘the world is, at present, being manifested by the viscous’ (p.
786); ‘as long as our contact with the viscous lasts, it is for us as if
viscosity were the meaning of the entire world’ (p. 786).
Like how the saturated phenomenon is paradigmatic for phenomen-
ality for Marion (2002a: 218, 227; 2010: 112), for Sartre the viscous
phenomenon outlines the way in which ‘the world’ as such is manifested
or indeed given to consciousness. As Warnock (1965: 100, 104) remarks
in her commentary on Sartre:
The viscous is an important category for us to employ in our
descriptions of the world just because it does, in itself, stand for
our relation with things-in-themselves . . . When I first meet with
something viscous I am presented with a genuine pattern in
things, something which will explain in general what the universe
is like, what my place in it is, and what my aims are.
In this reading, the viscous represents how consciousness relates to
‘things-in-themselves’, or even, how ‘things-in-themselves’ reveal them-
selves to consciousness. The viscous is the symbolic figure of phenomen-
ality which epitomizes the way in which the universe is disclosed to
consciousness (Meyers, 2008: 91).
Compared to Descartes’ infinity, Kant’s sublime, or Husserl’s internal
consciousness of time, which Marion lists as historical precedents of his
account of saturated phenomena, Sartre’s analysis of the viscous presents
an account of phenomenality in terms of self-giving (or even self-gifting)
that more directly anticipates Marion’s account of givenness as the key
characteristic of phenomenality. As Sartre writes (and emphasizes) at the
outset of his analysis:
the viscous discloses [révèle] and develops its viscosity . . . from the
first appearance of anything viscous . . . [viscosity is] already a gift of
itself [déjà don de soi]. (Sartre, 2020: 785, emphasis in original)
Like Marion’s aforementioned emphasis that a phenomenon as that
which shows itself inasmuch as it gives itself and the gift is an exemplary
figure of phenomenality, Sartre’s account of the viscous phenomenon as
one which ‘shows’ (révèle) itself to consciousness as ‘a gift of itself’ is
nothing less than a notion of pure givenness. It is an exemplary figure
of phenomenality – of the way in which the world is disclosed to
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consciousness, a phenomenon which indeed shows itself inasmuch as it
gives itself.
Concluding Remarks
One of the ways in which phenomenology has contributed to contem-
porary social and cultural critique is through Levinas’ notion of ‘the
Other’, which has resourced many politico-ethical reflections from the
theoretical questions concerning human identity to more concrete issues
such as the refugee crisis. However, whereas Levinas’ account of ‘the
Other’ always pertains to a human other, recent cultural and social
theory has increasing turned its attention to nonhuman entities, such as
animals, plants, inanimate objects, or even the environment per se. With
his account of the ‘counter-experiences’ of saturated phenomena,
Marion’s ‘more radical return to the things themselves’ could be regarded
as an expansion of Levinas’ account of the inversion or reversal of inten-
tionality in one’s encounter with (the human face of) the Other to various
saturated phenomena which may include nonhuman ‘things’ (cf.
Gschwandtner, 2018: 456). However, by Marion’s own definition of
the saturated phenomenon, the perceiver who is overwhelmed by the
excessive phenomenality of the saturated phenomenon she encounters
can never be exactly sure whether what she has encountered is a
human, nonhuman, or even supernatural phenomenon (see Marion,
2002a: esp. 202–6).14
This is partly the reason why Marion’s account of saturated phenom-
ena is often regarded as an attempt to make ‘room for God to show
Himself’ within phenomenology (Welten, 2005: 206; cf. Janicaud, 2000),
an accusation that can hardly be made against Sartre, the avowed athe-
ist.15 Indeed, as opposed to Marion’s saturated phenomenon – which
Marion (2002a: 234–47; 2008: 1–17) notably argues finds its utmost
expression in religious revelation, Sartre’s viscous slime is unquestionably
not a supernatural phenomenon: the viscous slime is for Sartre nothing
more than an inanimate object that is without any latent conscious or
‘supernatural’ capacities.16 But by reading Sartre’s early work in relation
to Marion’s ‘radical return’ to ‘things’, we can see how Sartre’s phenom-
enology is not merely focused on the structures of human subjectivity but
also pays much attention to the ways in which inanimate objects such as
the viscous slime can significantly impact and alter states of human con-
sciousness like Marion’s saturated phenomena, as if such entities have
the capacity or even ‘agency’ to exert influence over intentional human
subjects. In this regard, we can understand why Brian McNely (2019)
argues that Sartre’s phenomenology of ‘nonhuman phenomena’ has
much to offer to the contemporary theoretical interest in human–nonhu-
man interaction in recent social and cultural theory.17
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The analysis of the nonhuman phenomenon of the viscous slime in
the final chapter of Being and Nothingness is, of course, not an
account of God or the supernatural. What consciousness for-itself
experiences in its encounter with the viscous phenomenon as the
‘revenge’ of the in-itself is emphatically not God’s revelation or
some supernatural phenomena. To the contrary, it is a manifestation
of ‘the opposite of the ‘‘In-itself-For-itself’’,’ i.e. the opposite of God.
The ‘excess’ experienced by consciousness is a phenomenological
expression of the way in which the in-itself – the being of phenomena
– transcends the finite grasp of the for-itself’s consciousness: that there
can never be an existent ‘In-itself-For-itself’ – there can never be a
coincidence of being in-itself and consciousness for-itself. In other
words, whereas religious phenomenologists like Marion (2002b: 158–62)
may see saturated phenomena or counter-experiences of ‘excess’ as
possible indications of the divine, in Sartre’s avowed atheistic view
such overwhelming experiences of phenomenal excess are nothing
but reminders that the being of phenomena forever exceeds intentional
consciousness – which for Sartre means that God does not and cannot
exist (cf. Leung, 2021: esp. 41–2).18
What the foregoing comparative reading of Sartre and Marion
shows is that one does not need to hold a quasi-theological outlook
to arrive at the phenomenological insights on givenness or counter-
experiences, that the ‘turn’ away from conscious intentionality towards
phenomenality and excess that we find in Marion and other contem-
porary Christian phenomenologists does not necessarily imply an
underlying hidden religious incentive: that the alleged ‘theological
turn’ is not necessarily theologically motivated. Indeed, one may
even say that Sartre offers a different – indeed explicitly atheistic –
way for phenomenology to arrive at the observations central to its
‘theological’ turn to ‘excess’. While Marion would most probably be
displeased to see his notion of saturated phenomenon compared to
Sartre’s viscous slime or to see his phenomenology compared with
what he sees as the ‘vulgar atheism’ of Sartre (Marion, 2012a: 244,
note 19), re-reading Sartre’s phenomenological works in light of
Marion’s not only highlights ways in which the latter’s insights are
motivated and informed by phenomenological reasons (or perhaps at
times alternatively by his religious commitments). An engagement
between Sartre’s explicitly atheistic outlook with Marion’s phenomen-
ology which often appeals to religious and theological themes can
moreover open up new conversations and fresh perspectives into
understanding the developments and trajectories of the phenomeno-
logical tradition in its various strands, and indeed how traditional
phenomenological analysis can contribute to contemporary social
and cultural theory.19




1. Unlike Husserl before him (and Sartre after him), Heidegger famously dis-
cards the traditional notion of transcendental consciousness. However,
Marion (2008: 13; 1998: 70) argues that Husserl’s (and Brentano’s) emphasis
on human consciousness as intentionality still very much underlies
Heidegger’s conception of human Dasein as Being-in-the-world.
2. Like Marion’s (1998: 186–96) emphasis on the role of Heidegger’s
Grundstimmung of boredom in his ‘second reduction’, Sartre (2020: 6)
argues that the phenomenon of being is reduced and disclosed to us through
the feelings of boredom as well as nausea, which Sartre famously elaborates
in his novel of the same title.
3. See Marion (1998: esp. 46–57), as well as Marion’s explicit definition of
‘phenomenality as the Being of the phenomenon’ (p. 66), as opposed to
‘the phenomenon of Being’ (pp. 56, 167–9).
4. Cf. Sartre’s (2020: 6–7) critique of the reduction of phenomena to objects,
which may be attributed to Husserl or the ‘first reduction’. However, despite
the parallels with Marion’s ‘third reduction’, Marion would probably object
to Sartre’s use of ‘being’ in his notion of ‘the being of phenomena’.
5. However, many argue that the idea of ‘inverted intentionality’ could ultimately
be traced back to Sartre’s (2020: 355–66) analysis of ‘the gaze’ in Being and
Nothingness. See Welten (2004: 89–90); Westphal (2006: 121, 133); Mackinlay
(2010: 161–2, 168, 171–2, esp. 172): ‘Marion acknowledges Levinas’ contribu-
tion to a phenomenology of the other person, [but] his description of the other
person’s look in Being Given makes no mention of ethical injunction, and is
more akin to Sartre’s analysis than to that of Levinas.’
6. Marion argues that the recipient of saturated phenomena can no longer be
called a transcendental I or subject but is better described as a receiver or
what Marion (2008: 123, 125) calls l’adonné (translated as ‘the gifted’ or
sometimes ‘the devoted’), one who is ‘given over to’ (adonné à) a phenom-
enon. For Marion, l’adonné is the receiver of the given phenomenon whose
identity and status are defined and given by none other than the phenomenon
or indeed the phenomenality of givenness itself (Marion, 2002b: 43–53, 98–
102, esp. 45; 2002a: 248–52, 262–71) – somewhat echoing Sartre’s aforemen-
tioned ‘purified’ account of a consciousness that is only ‘pure appearance’
and ‘no longer has anything of the subject’. In other words, it is not the
conscious subject who constitutes the phenomenon but rather the given phe-
nomenon which constitutes the identity of the conscious recipient.
7. However, Marion (2017: 14) claims that Sartre essentially had no influence
on him: ‘From the time of high school onward, Sartre no longer existed. He
never played the least intellectual role for me.’ Sartre is also notably absent in
Marion’s (1998) survey of the development of the phenomenological
tradition.
8. One might also note that the famous café scene in Being and Nothingness
where Sartre (2020: 41–2) depicts the absence of his friend Pierre with whom
he had an appointment is precisely a phenomenological account of the
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‘unapparent’ and the ‘invisible’, or even of that which is unforeseen and
cannot be aimed at (cf. Leung, 2020: 478–80) – not unlike Marion’s
(2002a: 19) saturated phenomena which ‘cannot be aimed at’.
9. See Collins and Pierce (1975). See also the critical responses to the ‘sexist’
charges against Sartre’s conception of the slime in Mui (1990); Burstow
(1992).
10. Similarly, Warnock (1965: 99–107) remarkably dedicates nine pages of her
181-page book to discussing the viscous, where five pages (pp. 101–4) are
used for simply quoting Sartre’s passage from Being and Nothingness.
11. To the extent that consciousness for-itself can become ‘absorbed’ by the
viscous, Sartre (2020: 789) argues that one’s encounter of the viscous can
be ‘the beginning of a continuity between the viscous substance and myself
. . . a flowing of myself into the viscous’. As such, there are certain structural
parallels between Sartre’s (2020: 790) proposition that human perceivers
‘become viscous’ in an encounter with the viscous and Marion’s aforemen-
tioned account of consciousness becoming ‘the gifted’ (see note 6 above) in
its experience of saturated phenomena: The status of consciousness in both
Sartre’s and Marion’s cases is defined, constituted, and indeed given by the
phenomenon.
12. Cf. McNely (2019: 207): ‘Sartre favors viscosity [for his analysis] because it
signals a potential collapse of [all] ontologies.’ See also Sartre’s (2020: 791–
2) earlier description in Being and Nothingness of how contact with the
viscous ‘enriches’ consciousness with ‘an ontological scheme’ which tran-
scends the commonly-assumed ‘distinction between the psychological and
non-psychological’ to ‘interpret the meaning of being of all existents of a
certain category, a category which, moreover, arises as an empty frame [un
cadre vide] before the experience of the various types of the viscous.’
13. One may also note that there is an operation of radical phenomenological
reduction to the ‘pure, encountered existence’ of the viscous in Sartre’s
(2020: 785) phenomenological analysis of the ‘counter-experience of viscos-
ity as one where the viscous phenomenon is fundamentally ‘‘reduced’’:
making the viscous render all its meanings as something a priori and
formal . . . since it does not depend primarily on the way of being that
belongs to the viscous, but only on its brute being-there, its pure, encoun-
tered existence.’
14. See note 18 below.
15. However, recent scholarship has also seen much discussion of Sartre’s rela-
tion to Christian theology (e.g. Kirkpatrick, 2018; Catalano, 2020; Leung,
2021; cf. Khawaja, 2016).
16. This is one important difference between Sartre’s analysis of the viscous
slime and his different but not unrelated account of ‘the gaze’ of the
Other – of another conscious human subject. See note 5 above.
17. Furthermore, unlike Marion who sees ontology and metaphysics as strictly
incompatible with phenomenology, Sartre’s view on the continuity of phe-
nomenological analysis and ontological inquiry is particularly suitable for a
conversation with the recent social and cultural theoretical discussion of the
ontological status of ‘things’ that are often speculative or even metaphysical
in orientation.
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18. Cf. Kearney (2001: 33): ‘If the saturating phenomenon is really as bedazzling
as Marion suggests, how can we tell the difference between the divine and its
opposites?’
19. I would like to thank Amber Bowen and Deborah Casewell for their com-
ments on an earlier version of this paper and the Templeton Religion Trust
for their generous funding which made the research for this article possible.
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